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BIODEFENSE: WHO'S IN CHARGE?
Victoria Suttont
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent anthrax attacks demonstrated more than what any
number of scholarly articles could describe about our lack of organ-
izational and federalism considerations for responding to a domestic
biological attack.
In 2000, The National Commission on Terrorism, a Congressional
commission, concluded that the Department of Defense should be the
lead agency rather than the FBI or FEMA, the current federal agency
leaders in a terrorist attack, writing that the Pentagon's "ability to
command and control vast resources for dangerous, unstructured
situations is unmatched by any other department or agency."1
Joshua Lederberg, Nobel Prize Recipient for discovering genetic
recombinant DNA techniques and the organization of genetic material
of bacteria, was asked in Spring 2001, "If you could suggest one thing
to the government that it should focus on, or one thing that needs im-
proving, what would that be?" He responded, "Coordination of the
different response agencies. At this point, structure is all important.
There are lots of resources available or could be made available if [the
government] could develop some concerted cooperative effort, but it
is still fragmented.",
2
t Victoria Sutton is Professor of Law and Director, Center for Biodefense,
Law and Public Policy, Texas Tech University School of Law
(www.ttu.edu/biodefense). She is a graduate of American University, Washington
College of Law, J.D., magna cum laude; University of Texas at Dallas, PhD; Old
Dominion University, MPA; and North Carolina State University, B.S., B.S. cum
laude. She is the former Assistant Director of the White House Science Office
(OSTP) (1989-93), where she was responsible for the coordination of the work of the
Cabinet level departments and other agencies in the President's scientific initiatives.
She has served as a consultant to the DARPA, DOD and the U.S. Attorney's Office
on legal issues in bioterrorism, and has written numerous articles and books, includ-
ing, Law and Bioterrorism (Carolina Academic Press, 2003).
1 Panel Recommends Pentagon Response to Domestic Terror Threat,
DRUDGE REPORT (June 3, 2000), available at http://www.drudgereport.com.
2 "Interview with Joshua Lederberg," 6 The Georgetown Public Policy
Review 135 (Spring 2001).
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In 2000 and 2001, law review articles by this author encouraged a
national approach to defense against bioterrorism through a coordi-
nated interagency system, and federal legislation to address the shift
in federalism from states to the federal government in the area of pub-
lic health law during peacetime.3
After the fall anthrax attacks, the President established an Office
of Homeland Security and appointed Governor Tom Ridge to head the
new organization in the Executive Office of the President, in Novem-
ber. In June 2002, the President proposed legislation to create a De-
partment of Homeland Security, which would take parts of depart-
ments and combine them into a cabinet-level department with the mis-
sion of homeland security.
In response to that legislation, David Walker, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, testified before Congress that "federal initia-
tives should be conceived as national, not federal in nature."4 Rarely
has been made such a statement favoring movement toward a national
approach by a federal official in an official capacity. CDC continues
to operate in the pre-9- 11 world, relying upon the states in their public
health role, as do the states which continue to rely upon their tradi-
tional police powers in public health in their considerations of prepa-
ration and response to a bioterrorism event.
Why does the federal government seem in such a confused state
concerning the appropriate preparedness and response responsibili-
ties?
This article seeks to describe the current organizational structure,
the role of the federal agencies in the context of biodefense and the
federalism relationship with the states. The President's proposal for a
Department of Homeland Security is also examined in the context of
3 See Victoria V. Sutton, A Precarious Legal "Hot Zone" - The President's
Plan to Combat Bioterrorism, 164 MIL. L. REV. 135 (June 2000) (examining the pre-
paredness of government to effectively respond to bioterrorism emergencies). See
also Victoria V. Sutton, Bioterrorism Preparation and Response Legislation - The
Struggle to Protect States' Sovereignty While Preserving National Security, 6 GEO.
PUB. POL'Y REV. 2, (Spring 2001).
4 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Gov-
ernment Information, Committee on the Judiciary, Statement of David Walker,
Comptroller General of the United States, "Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit,
But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success," GAO-02-886T (2002), at
http://www.gao.gov/main.html.
5 The local tabletop exercises in bioterrorism, funded and planned pursuant
to the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act of 1996, include only a local and state response
with no role for an assumption of the response activity by the federal government.
Exercises can move to completion with no material involvement by the federal gov-
ernment in a biological attack!
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the legal implications for biodefense, and the shift in federalism in
that proposal. In conclusion, although the Congress passed legislation
creating a Department of Homeland Security, the responsibility for a
defense against bioterrorism remains undefined, and this article rec-
ommends a national approach to biodefense and considerations for the
future are discussed.
II. CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR
BIODEFENSE
There are three major failures which will continue to create, an
impasse in identifying appropriate governmental leadership and which
threaten our ability to organize our federal interagency and intra-
governmental coordination. First, is the failure to separately organize
our resources for biodefense from that of other weapons of mass de-
struction; second, is the failure to recognize that because biological
terrorism is very different than any other threat with which we have
dealt, the usual lead agencies are not appropriate in terms of training
or resources; and third, is the failure to address the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the state and local government sys-
tems because of state sovereignty issues in public health.
First, the failure to recognize that all weapons of mass destruction
are not created equally prevents us from organizing our resources in a
manner which addresses the uniqueness of biological warfare. For
several obvious reasons, biological weapons are very different from
chemical and nuclear weapons. Nuclear and chemical attacks are
relatively straightforward - we know immediately when we have been
attacked; we know that that attack is not a naturally occurring event;
and we know that chemical and nuclear attacks are spent at the mo-
ment of the attack, while a biological attack leads to an exponential
increase in harm through the procreative nature of biological organ-
isms. To group weapons of mass destruction together and address
them simultaneously is either to ignore the threat or to be completely
insensitive to the differences. This has pervaded approaches to effec-
tive action by our federal government: Congressional legislation,
such as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act provided funding on the basis
of this group of weapons, for training; and the Executive Branch - the
Department of Defense - organized chemical, biological and nuclear
threats under one command.
The incidents involving biological threats have increased to a ma-
jority of all cases of weapons of mass destruction, further exacerbat-
ing the failure to address the unique threat of bioterrorism. In testi-
2003]
HEAL TH M TRIX
mony in 20016, the FBI reported the following number of cases since
1998.
Figure 1: Proportion of Biological Cases and other Cases of
WMD (Source: Sutton, Law and Bioterrorism (Carolina Aca-
demic Press (2002))
Proportion of Biological Cases and other Cases
of WMD
1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Second, the agencies identified to take the lead against bioterror-
ism are the usual players in domestic crime and natural disasters, but
very much the wrong choices for the unique threat of biological war-
fare. In the Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63 (PDD 39,
62 and 63), the FBI is designated as the lead agency for "domestic
crisis response" and FEMA as the lead agency for "consequence man-
agement" for all weapons of mass destruction. The Centers for Dis-
ease Control (CDC) its Epidemiology Investigative Service (EIS) and
the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) are the world's leading centers for forensic epidemiol-
ogical investigative analyses and have been recommended by leading
terrorism experts for leadership roles in bioterrorism, yet our federal
organization merely makes them supporting players should the FBI
choose to call upon them.
Third, the relationship between the national and state government
during peacetime gives power to the states in public health authority,
in accordance with the Tenth Amendment. Not until there exists a
6 Statement for the Record of JT. Caruso on Bioterrorism Before the S.
Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism and Gov 't Information, Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/carusol 10601 .htm (Nov.
6,2001).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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national emergency, or an attack against the United States is made,
does the power to take control of a response shift to the federal gov-
ernment. In the case of bioterrorism, an attack may take place in
peacetime with no federal system of involvement under our current
federalism structure. Without involvement by the federal government
in a systematic way during peacetime, there is little chance that an
effective response to protect our nation will be made in the context of
an emergency shift in power. The federal government has typically
taken action in the form of legislation only in the wake of disasters.
For example, the Biologics Act of 1906 was in response to the deaths
of several children from a vaccine infected with tetanus; Superfund
was the result of the Love Canal environmental contamination inci-
dent; and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act of 1986 was in response to the accidental release of methyl isocy-
anate by Union Carbide into the Bhopal, India community.
In the summer of 2002, Congress acted to broaden the planning
powers of the CDC to include bioterrorism through the passage of the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparation and Response
Act of 2002. The President's proposal for a Department of Homeland
Security supporting the Homeland Security Act of 2002, further ad-
dressed some of the necessary institutional changes required for a
federal system of biodefense. November 25, 2002, the President
signed into law, legislation creating the Department of Homeland Se-
curity. Several major Presidential initiatives have followed including
Project Bioshield announced by President Bush in the State of the
Union address in January 2003, and later in March 2003, Secretary
Ridge announced Operation Liberty Shield. Both of these initiatives
specifically addressed bioterrorism, but failed to define the responsi-
bilities between state and federal governments, leaving implementa-
tion in question.
The federal public health agencies continue to coordinate in bio-
defense; while parts of agencies and departments critical to biodefense
in areas of federal control, e.g., environmental and agriculture areas,
were brought together under a departmental umbrella. An examina-
tion of the original statutory mission of these federal agencies and
departments and how the remaining agencies which were excluded
from this reorganization contribute to our nation's defense in bioter-
rorism is critical to our analysis of the function of the Department of
Homeland Security.
A. The FBI as the Lead Agency
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was formed by Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover to investigate racketeering and terrorism in the
2003]
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early twentieth century. Investigating terrorism is within the scope of
power intended by Congress for the FBI.
Apprehension of the bioterrorist is clearly within the mission of
the FBI, which reads as follows: "The mission of the FBI is to uphold
the law through the investigation of violations of federal criminal law;
to protect the United States from foreign intelligence and terrorist
activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to
federal, state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these
responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the Constitution of
the United States."8 The statutorily defined mission further defines
the scope of powers with the FBI.9 The FBI should clearly be in-
volved - leading the apprehension role, but equally clearly, should not
be directing the effort to either prepare for, or to respond to, bioterror-
ism. However, there is an effort to redefine the mission of the FBI in
the context of bioterrorism: In testimony before the U.S. Congress
November 6, 2001, Deputy Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism
Division of the FBI stated that, "the primary mission of law enforce-
ment and the public health community is saving lives." 10
The shortcomings of the FBI within the context of its current
leadership in biodefense, preparedness, and response have been identi-
fied to include its lack of expertise with respect to all weapons of
mass destruction, its limited experience in counter-intelligence within
governmental agencies; and its lack of skills crucial to the investiga-
tion and apprehension of extra-governmental counterintelligence
agents involved in bioterrorism events. For example, Senator Fein-
stein remarked after testimony from FBI Director Meuller, during the
first week in November, "I was really taken aback by how little they
seem to know.' In October, the FBI was consulted about the de-
struction of more than 100 vials of different anthrax strains collected
over decades by the Iowa State University in Ames, and even after
discovery that the Florida incident of anthrax was a result of terrorism,
8 What is the mission of the FBI?, General Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.htm (last visited April 4, 2002).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2002). "The Director, Associate Director, Assistant
to the Director, Assistant Directors, inspectors and agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice may carry firearms, serve warrants and
subpoenas issued under the authority of the United States and make arrests without
warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for
any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing such
felony."
10 CARUSO, supra note 7.
11 Dan Eggen & Jim McGee, FBI Rushes to Remake Its Mission, WASH.
POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al.
[Vol. 13:117
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the FBI approved the destruction of this vital collection.12 This more
than illustrates the absolute lack of understanding and training on the
part of the FBI in comprehending that the anthrax collection could
have provided invaluable evidence in identifying the source of the
anthrax, by comparing the DNA of the anthrax found in Florida with
that of strains in the collection. In another example, the FBI sought
advice concerning its investigation of a physician's report concerning
a black lesion on the calf of one of the 9-11 hijackers, Al Haznawi.
He was also identified as the suspect who inquired about the use of
cropdusters - a potential dissemination method for biological weap-
ons. In their investigation, the FBI contacted not the appropriate gov-
ernment agency, but Johns Hopkins University, which was reported to
have concluded that the lesion was likely to be the result of anthrax.
However, the Chair of the American Academy of Dermatology's
Bioterrorism Task Force, remarked that it was "highly unlikely" to
contract cutaneous anthrax on one's lower leg.' 3 The FBI's informal
search for expertise in medical and scientific forensic issues, such as
this one, highlight the insufficiencies of the agency.
But training alone is not sufficient for an agency which lacks the
ability to make a culture shift. Just in November, after at least six
weeks with which the FBI had the opportunity to become familiar
with anthrax investigations, the FBI still was not trained for basic in-
vestigations of anthrax threats. One former FBI agent was quoted as
saying, "It's just unrealistic to ask 7,000 agents to overnight become
sufficiently knowledgeable about bioterrorist agents and possible
means of theft of those items and how they might be disseminated
lethally to an American populace."'14 Experts have further commented
that the FBI "traditionally has had trouble understanding the language,
and the demands of science.' 5 Another expert concluded that the FBI
"are not geared up for prevention of anything."' 6
However, within the appropriate scope of powers delegated by
Congress to the FBI, its efforts to coordinate the criminal investiga-
tion effort with the U.S. Postal Service are appropriate. The FBI
12 William J. Broad et al., Experts See FBI Missteps Hampering Anthrax
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at Al (explaining how the FBI does not com-
pletely understand how science can increase the agency's effectiveness).
13 Steve Fainaru & Ceci Connolly, Memo on Florida Case Roils Anthrax
Probe, Experts Debate Theory Hijacker Was Exposed, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at
A3.
14 Broad et al., supra note 13 (quoting former FBI forensic metallurgist, Bill
Tobin).
15 Id.
16 Eggen & McGee, supra note 12.
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maintains a website with information about the anthrax investigation 17
and contact information, describing a cooperative effort with the U.S.
Postal Service in developing protocols, and offering a reward for in-
formation leading to the arrest and conviction of the mailers of the
four envelopes containing anthrax. The role in developing protocols
for mail-handling, however, is not within the scope of powers dele-
gated to the FBI, and should be the role of a public health agency,
such as the Public Health Service, or the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention.
1. The Process of Response to a Potential Bioterrorism Event
In Congressional testimony, in October 2001, the FBI confirmed
their leadership role in crisis management with FEMA's leadership
role in consequence management and together, the responsibility for
coordination of the overall federal government response. 18 The re-
sponse, the FBI, testifies,
begins with a threat assessment coordinated by the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU). This is ini-
tiated when the FBI receives notification of an incident or
threat. WMDOU immediately notifies subject matter experts
and federal agencies with relevant authorities to conduct a
real-time assessment and determine the credibility of the
threat. Based on the credibility and scope of the threat,
WMDOU will coordinate an appropriate and tailored re-
sponse by federal assets and the owners and operators of the
facility to meet the requirements of the on-scene responders,
and will oversee the investigation to its successful conclusion.
About one month later, in November 2001, in Congressional tes-
timony, the FBI presented its approach to the bioterrorism threat in
terms of a coordinated approach. The FBI official presented the
bioterrorism threat as one of either an overt attack or a covert attack -
the overt attack being "an announced release of an agent, often with
some type of articulated threat," such as an envelope containing an-
thrax with an announcement that the recipient has been exposed to
17 Amerithrax 
- Seeking Injbrmation, at
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited April 25, 2002).
18 Terrorism: Are Americana's Water Resources and Environment at Risk?
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Env't of the House Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, (2001) (statement of Ronald L. Dick, Deputy Ass.
Director, Counterterrorism Division and Director, National Infrastructure Protection
Center, FBI).
[Vol. 13:117
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anthrax; the covert threat being one that is a release "not accompanied
by any articulated or known threat."'19 The difference, the FBI testi-
fies, is that the FBI takes the lead in both types of attacks, but in the
covert attack the public health community is the first to detect the
attack, and once it is known as an attack, the FBI assumes the lead.
In addressing biological threats, the FBI divides the response into
two areas: the local and the federal. The division is made between
coordination at the local level and a separate coordination approach at
the federal level: state or local public health officials work with the
local FBI WMD Coordinator, of which there is one in every FBI of-
fice; but at the federal level, the FBI and CDC work together.
The FBI also testified to the coordination with other federal agen-
cies. After the threat assessment is made, the FBI alone determines
the credibility of the threat, the immediate concerns involving health
and safety of the responding personnel, and the requisite level of re-
sponse warranted by the federal government. Then input from:
[T]he necessary federal agencies with an interest in the par-
ticular incident. In a biological event, representatives from
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS), United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) are the key agencies called upon to assist
FBI personnel in assessing the particular threat. Based upon
the assessment, a determination is made as to the level of re-
sponse necessary to adequately address the particular threat,
which could range from a full federal response if the threat is
deemed credible to collection of the material in an effort to
rule out the presence of any biological material if the threat is
deemed not credible.
After the threat assessment is made, the FBI alone determines the
level of response, which may include the determination of biological
factors. Throughout this process, the FBI is potentially acting without
the input from other agencies.
The collection of any biological material is also within the juris-
diction of the FBI under PDD 39 and 62, and the FBI follows their
Hazardous Material Response Unit (HMRU) protocols which are the
same as those used by local HAZMAT teams. In August 2002, the
FBI, in association with the Epidemiology Investigation Service (EIS)
19 CARUSO, supra note 7.
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produced a draft protocol for guidance in the collection of biological
materials in a potential bioterrorist event.
A common protocol, recognized and followed by all federal agen-
cies, state and local HAZMAT teams, is necessary to ensure that suf-
ficient evidentiary samples are collected, screened and overpacked
according to scientific safety guidelines for transportation to the ap-
propriate testing facility, as well as in recognition of the need to
document the chain of custody and the observance of protocols for
criminal prosecution evidentiary matters. The FBI initiates and leads
the collection procedure, but depends upon the more than 85 state
health laboratories to perform analyses on behalf of CDC in the coor-
dinated collection of facilities known as the Laboratory Response
Network (LRN). Once the testing is completed, results are provided
to the FBI for dissemination in the appropriate manner. The results of
the analysis are then disseminated to first the exposed person or per-
sons, then local first responders and the local public health depart-
ment. Additionally, results will be forwarded to the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, GA. In this protocol,
the CDC joins the investigation late in the process, and is effectively
isolated from early decision-making processes.
2. The FBI Re-Organization
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is part of the Department of
Justice, which has been undergoing reorganization. On November 8,
2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced a "wartime reor-
ganization ''20 suggesting that Attorney General John Ashcroft intends
to maintain the FBI in its current role in the plan to respond to bioter-
rorism under the current PDD 39. While the role of apprehension of a
bioterrorist within the domestic territory of the United States is clearly
within the scope of the mission of the FBI, the complexity of the
threat belies what seems to be a simple decision for leadership.
The organizational changes published on November 8, 2001 do
not account for the range of expertise required for biological threats,
again, focusing on intelligence and investigation which have roles in
the process, but certainly not the elements necessary to take the lead
for the national security plan to combat bioterrorism. The following
organizational chart was presented to the public by the Director of the
FBI on November 8, 2001 with the new offices highlighted in their
reorganization. It is immediately evident that weapons of mass de-
20 David Johnston, Ashcroft Plan Would Recast Justice Dept. in a War Mode,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at B1.
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struction are not separately identified, nor are any of those treated
separately (nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological).
Figure 2: Federal Bureau of Investigation, REORGANIZATION
CHART OF THE FBI (2001)21
B. The Role of the CDC
The role of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is lim-
ited in scope and recognizes the sovereignty of states in the regulation
of public health, with some emergency powers. However, the Public
Health Act and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
provides for an expanded role for the CDC in peacetime involvement
with the management of states' surveillance activities.
The statutory authority granted to CDC describes the sharing of
powers between the federal government and the states. This power
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to accept aid
from the states for federally imposed quarantines, and to "assist States
and their political subdivisions in the prevention and suppression of
communicable diseases. 22 The power also includes the resources to
provide planning and training to the states and to provide assistance
"at the request of the state" for any public health emergency for a pe-
21 Federal Bureau of Investigation, REORGANIZATION CHART OF THE FBI
(2001), at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/12/chart.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
22 42 U.S.C. § 243(a) (2000) (emphasizing a cooperative federal and state
program).
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riod of time.23 The CDC protocol for reporting bioterrorism events
optimistically directs the public health community as follows: The
public health sector has important responsibilities related to BT de-
tection, response, and control of health consequences, but the public
health response will be most effective if the overall response by all
sectors - pre-hospital and hospital care, law enforcement, public
safety, etc. - is coordinated by the FBI.24 However, the CDC suggests
that the state health departments should voluntarily contact the CDC
in the event of a potential attack - but this is only on a voluntary ba-
sis. 25 Cooperative agreements between the CDC and volunteer asso-
23 42 U.S.C. § 243 (2000). § 243. General grant of authority for coopera-
tion. (a) Enforcement of quarantine regulations; prevention of communicable dis-
eases. The Secretary is authorized to accept from State and local authorities any
assistance in the enforcement of quarantine regulations made pursuant to this Act
which such authorities may be able and willing to provide. The Secretary shall also
assist States and their political subdivisions in the prevention and suppression of
communicable diseases and with respect to other public health matters, shall cooper-
ate with and aid State and local authorities in the enforcement of their quarantine and
other health regulations, and shall advise the several States on matters relating to the
preservation and improvement of the public health. (b) Comprehensive and continu-
ing planning; training of personnel for State and local health work, fees. The Secre-
tary shall encourage cooperative activities between the States with respect to com-
prehensive and continuing planning as to their current and future health needs, the
establishment and maintenance of adequate public health services, and otherwise
carrying out public health activities. The Secretary is also authorized to train person-
nel for State and local health work. The Secretary may charge only private entities
reasonable fees for the training of their personnel under the preceding sentence. (c)
Development of plan to control epidemics and meet emergencies or problems result-
ing from disasters; cooperative planning; temporary assistance; reimbursement of
United States. (1) The Secretary is authorized to develop (and may take such action
as may be necessary to implement) a plan under which personnel, equipment, medical
supplies, and other resources of the Service and other agencies under the jurisdiction
of the Secretary may be effectively used to control epidemics of any disease or condi-
tion and to meet other health emergencies or problems. The Secretary may enter into
agreements providing for the cooperative planning between the Service and public
and private community health programs and agencies to cope with health problems
(including epidemics and health emergencies). (2) The Secretary may, at the request
of the appropriate State or local authority, extend temporary (not in excess of six
months) assistance to State or localities in meeting health emergencies of such a
nature as to warrant Federal assistance. The Secretary may require such reimburse-
ment of the United States for assistance provided under this paragraph as he may
determine to be reasonable under the circumstances. Any reimbursement so paid
shall be credited to the applicable appropriation for the Service for the year in which
such reimbursement is received.
24 Interim Recommended Notification Procedures for Local and State Public
Health Department Leaders in the Event of a Bioterrorist Incident, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/EmContact/Determine.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2001).
25 Interim Recommended Notification Procedures for Local and State Public
Health Department Leaders in the Even of a Bioterrorist Incident, at
[Vol. 13:117
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ciations such as the Association of State and Territorial Epidemiolo-
gists (ASTE) and others provide, for example, uniform case reporting
criteria for communicable diseases.26
However, the U.S. Congress recognized that the CDC mission and
povers do not fit the new demands of bioterrorism, and amended the
scope of the powers of CDC in the Public Health Security and Bioter-
rorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. In their findings, the
Congress "finds that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
has an essential role in defending against and combating public health
threats .... ,27 The Public Health Security Act expanded and en-
hanced existing powers and responsibilities in capabilities in prepar-
edness and response to public health emergencies, training, communi-
cations and improving surveillance and laboratory facilities for emer-
gencies, 28 but stopped short of any substantive expansion of the role
of CDC.
1. Federal Quarantine Power
The CDC has Congressionally mandated authority to impose
quarantines where there is a threat of interstate transmission of a
communicable disease 29 based upon Constitutionally delegated power
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. 30  The CDC shall only
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/EmContact/Notify 1 .htm (Nov. 4, 2001).
26 See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Case Definitions for
Infectious Conditions Under Public Health Surveillance, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT, May 2, 1997, at 57 (collaborating on definitions of infectious condi-
tions with the ASTE).
27 42 U.S.C. § 247d-4 (2002). Revitalizing the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (a) Facilities; capacities. (1) Findings. Congress finds that the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention has an essential role in defending. against
and combating public health threats and requires secure and modern facilities, and
expanded and improved capabilities related to bioterrorism and other public health
emergencies, sufficient to enable such Centers to conduct this important mission.
28 Id. Revitalizing the Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention (3) Improv-
ing the capacities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The Secretary.
• . shall expand, enhance, and improve the capabilities of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention relating to preparedness for and responding effectively to
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Activities that may be carried out
under the preceding sentence include - (A) expanding or enhancing the training of
personnel; (B) improving communications facilities and networks, including delivery
of necessary information to rural areas; (C) improving capabilities for public health
surveillance and reporting activities, taking into account the integrated system or
systems of public health alert communications and surveillance networks under sub-
section (b); and (D) improving laboratory facilities related to bioterrorism and other
public health emergencies, including increasing the security of such facilities.
29 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002).
30 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, provides [Congress shall have power] "To
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implement these measures where the state's measures are "insufficient
to prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such
State . . .to any other.",31 However, if this quarantine requires the
detention of individuals rather than commodities, the quarantine is
limited to individuals who have a list of specific communicable dis-
eases.
32
The CDC published the first comprehensive document to address
a strategic plan for anti-bioterrorism. In 1998, CDC completed a plan
to address emerging diseases and a plan for prevention with Prevent-
ing Emerging Infectious Disease: A Strategy for the 21s' Century
which focused on four areas: surveillance and outbreak response;
applied research in diagnostic tests, drugs, and vaccines; infrastructure
and training; and disease prevention and control. In 1999, a CDC
representative testified before Congress that in their bioterrorism co-
ordination, they work closely with the Department of Justice, includ-
ing the FBI and the National Domestic Preparedness Office, with the
Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the
Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency.33
On September 11, 2001, the CDC sent an alert to state and local
governments entitled, "Terrorist Activity Response Health Advisory,"
alerting the health departments that "CDC is on heightened alert status
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."31 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2001) (emphasis omitted). Measures in the event of
inadequate local control Whenever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention determines that the measures taken by health authorities of any
State or possession (including political subdivisions thereoj) are insufficient to
prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such State or posses-
sion to any other State or possession, he/she may-take such measures to prevent
such spread of the diseases as he/she deems reasonably necessary, including in-
spection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of
animals or articles believed to be sources of infection.32 Interstate Quarantine, 42 C.F.R. § 70.6 (2001). Apprehension and deten-
tion of persons with specific diseases. Regulations prescribed in this part are not
applicable to the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals
except for the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of the
following diseases: Anthrax, chancroid, cholera, dengue, diphtheria, granuloma
inguinale, infectious encephalitis, favus, gonorrhea, leprosy, lymphogranuloma
venereum, meningococcus meningitis, plague, poliomyelitis, psittacosis, relapsing
fever, ringworm of the scalp, scarlet fever, streptococcic sore throat, smallpox,
syphilis, trachoma, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, typhus, and yellow fever.
33 Enhancing National Public Health Capacity to Respond to Bioterrorism:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on National Security, Veterans Affairs and Interna-
tional Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform, 10 5th Cong. (1999)
(testimony of Dr. Scott R. Lillibridge).
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to monitor for any possible unusual disease patterns associated with
today's events, including chemical and biological agents. 34 There
was an immediate effort to respond to the possibility of a biological
attack as well as the immediate concern of the use of the airlines for
attacks.
2. Existing Programs in CDC for Biodefense
35
The federalism relationship between the CDC and state and local
governments, has resulted in a series of programs to fill public health
needs which include associations and non-governmental entities.
i. Programs with local and state governments
Emerging Infections Program (EIP). The CDC has established
EIP sites by entering into agreements with selected state health de-
partments in collaboration with local academic, government, and pri-
vate sector organizations, to establish sites that conduct active, popu-
lation-based surveillance for selected diseases, as well as for unex-
plained deaths and severe illnesses in previously healthy people.
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
This is a system for public health surveillance which will support
automated collection, transmission and monitoring of disease data
from multiple sources (clinicians' offices, laboratories, etc.) from lo-
cal to state health departments to the CDC. NEDSS will replace mul-
tiple and independently designed systems.
ii. Training
Epidemiologic and Laboratory Capacity (E.C.) Program. The
CDC has implemented this system with more than 75 public health
professionals (including 24 Epidemiologists and 25 laboratorians) as
part of the training effort to assist state and large local health depart-
ments to acquire the skills and resources to address infectious dis-
eases.
34 City of Lubbock, Health Department Receives Alert from the CDC in
Response to Terrorist Activities (Sept. 11, 2001), available at
http://www.ci.lubbock.tx.us/article.asp?ID=373 (last modified Mar. 18, 2002).
35 See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health Emergency
Response: The CDC Role, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/DocumentsApp/ImprovingBioDefense/ImprovingBioDefense.
asp (last reviewed Oct. 14, 2001) (including early detection and rapid communica-
tions programs).
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iii. Programs with Associations and other Non-Governmental Entities
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPSP) and the Metropoli-
tan Medical Response Systems. CDC has developed a stockpile of
vaccines, drugs and anti-toxins which can reach the victims anywhere
in the continental U.S. within 12 hours. The Metropolitan Medical
Response Systems (MMRS) contracts with local entities for distribu-
tion of the pharmaceuticals, when the demand is made. In October
2001, a representative of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices testified that the MMRS is a system of contracts with existing
emergency response systems, medical and health providers, mental
health providers, public health departments, law enforcement and fire
departments, emergency medical services and the National Guard "to
provide an integrated, unified response to a mass casualty event."
There are currently about 100 systems throughout the United
States and they each have the responsibility for the first 24 hours fol-
lowing an identified disease outbreak. They are expected to have the
capability to provide immunization and prophylaxis as well as the
capability to distribute material deployed to the local site from the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile.36
The Epi-X Project. This system is a secure, moderated, web-
based exchange for public health officials to rapidly report and discuss
disease outbreaks and other health events which may indicate a bioter-
rorism event. The system is staffed with real-time expertise to assure
rapid contact with state and local officials and to provide accurate
information.37 As part of this project, CDC has initiated programs in
cooperation with professional organizations:
(1) The National Health Alert Network (HAN)
The CDC is implementing this national system in partnership with
the National Association of County and City Health Officials
(NACCHO), the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
(ASTHO), and other health organizations. The HAN will assist in
communications, information, distance-learning, and organizational
infrastructure to address the threat of bioterrorism, and will link all
public health agencies at the local, state, and federal levels by con-
36 Bioterrorism Preparedness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 106 h Cong.(2001) (statement of Dr. Scott R. Lillibridge).
37 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, National Bioterrorism Prepar-
edness and Response Initiative, at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/Documents/RegMeetingSlides/overview.PDF (last modified
May 8, 2000).
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tinuous high-speed connection to the Internet, broadcast communica-
tions, and satellite and web-based distance-learning.
(2) The Laboratory Response Network (LRN)
The fundamental goal of the Laboratory Response Network for
Bioterrorism (LRN) is to enhance laboratory capacity for prepared-
ness and response to an act of bioterrorism by providing a collabora-
tive network to facilitate rapid detection and analysis of chemical and
biological agents. The LRN is a joint project supported by CDC and
the Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL).38
The Epidemic Intelligence Service. The Epidemic Intelligence
Service (EIS) was created in 1951, in response to concerns about bio-
logical warfare during the Cold War. The EIS has been called upon to
investigate the first cases of hauntavirus, Legionnaire's Disease, West
Nile virus outbreak, and Ebola outbreaks in Uganda and Zaire. Ac-
cording to one report, the CIA asked the CDC to investigate the out-
break of West Nile Fever in New York City, as early as 1999, in reac-
tion to information from an Iraqi defector which raised concerns that
Saddam Hussein may have developed a West Nile-like encephalitis
and launched a bioterrorism attack.39
The EIS program is relatively small. It is a two-year, post-
graduate program of service for health professionals who gain experi-
ence and on-the-job training in epidemiology. Qualifications for the
appointment require that physicians have at least one year of clinical
training; persons with a Ph.D. Dr.P.H. or M.D. in epidemiology, bio-
statistics, the social or behavioral sciences, and the nutrition sciences;
dentists, physician assistants, and nurses have an M.P.H. or equivalent
degree; and that veterinarians have an M.P.H. or equivalent degree or
relevant public health experience.40
In January 2002, the EIS was comprised of 130 total EIS offi-
cers,41 but by April 2002, the EIS reported that their numbers had in-
creased to 146.42 Each year, the CDC admits 60-80 new agents for a
term in the EIS. In previous years, the EIS has addressed approxi-
mately 100 investigations requested by states and other countries, and
500 studies or consultations each year, but this is expected to increase
38 Id.
39 Elizabeth Kaledin, Virus: Bio-Terrorism Unlikely, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/10/11/national/main65855.shtml (last visited
Oct. 13, 2002).
40 Ctr. For Disease Control, Epidemic Intelligence Service Fact Sheet, at
http://www.cdc.gov/eis/about/factsheet/htm (last reviewed Feb. 22, 2002).
41 Id.
42 M.A.J. McKenna, War on Terrorism: CDC Enlists 146 Disease Detec-
tives; Unit Works in Epidemic Intelligence, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 7, 2002, at 12A.
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given the new cooperative guidance for investigations between the
FBI and the EIS.
The EIS was called to respond to the 9-11 attacks and the anthrax
attacks which followed. The EIS sent 35 members to New York City,
to assist the New York City Health Department in the ongoing moni-
toring of public health issues, immediately after the attacks on the
World Trade Center. Secretary Thompson explained the relationship
between the CDC and local government: "The CDC workers will
supplement local efforts in this regard and provide expertise in matters
relating to public health. We're responding as rapidly as possible to
any needs for resources the city and state need. 43 By April 2002, the
EIS had mobilized 136 officers from Atlanta for assignments related
to terrorism. Before this event, the largest single deployment in EIS
history was 46 officers, responding to the fear that Korean soldiers
had returned to the United States, possibly infected with biological
agents.44
3. Problems with the Current Role of the CDC
The CDC was the last federal agency among about a dozen to re-
ceive the report of a series of experiments performed in the spring of
2001 involving simulated anthrax-containing letters.45 These experi-
ments were performed in Ottawa and Alberta and showed that the
possibility of exposure was much greater than previously expected.
The Alberta research had been presented on May 31 through October
17. The October 17 th meeting was at the Canadian Embassy in Wash-
ington, DC, approximately three blocks from the U.S. Capitol, two
days after the Sen. Daschle letter was opened. The Ottawa research
was presented in mid-May in Canberra, Australia, at a meeting of civil
defense experts, where U.S. experts attended. FEMA contacted Pub-
lic Health Service and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
The State Department passed the research on to the FBI, Secret Ser-
vice and the U.S. Capitol Police. But the CDC did not hear about it
until a professor in epidemiology sent the research to a contact in the
CDC in November, about the time the anthrax threat was ending.
Bradley A. Perkins, the CDC's lead anthrax investigator, remarked:
"It would have been good to have that information.
43 U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, HHS Sends 35 Members of
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention EIS Team to NYC, (Sept. 14, 2001),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news.
44 McKenna, supra note 41.
45 David Brown, Agency with Most Need Didn't Get Anthrax Data, CDC
Unaware of Canadian Study Before Attacks, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at A3.
[Vol. 13:117
BIODEFENSE: WHO'SIN CHARGE?
Regarding the destruction of the anthrax cultures collection at the
University of Iowa, under regulations promulgated for the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the CDC was directed
to develop regulations for the destruction of biological agents. In
Congressional testimony in 1999, a CDC representative testified that
in accordance with these regulations "CDC must be notified of the
disposal or complete consumption of a select agent." Anthrax is one
of the select agents. In the months following the anthrax attacks, the
CDC was clearly the agency possessing the expertise necessary to
respond to the attacks. However, the federal organization under PDD
39 gives CDC only a supporting role to the FBI and FEMA. While
this works well for chemical, nuclear or bombs, this organizational
relationship fails to match the challenges of a biological event.
C. The Role of FEMA
The United States has utilized a policy of federal disaster assis-
tance since the Congressional Act of 1803, which responded with
federal disaster assistance to New Hampshire. The federal approach
relied upon special legislation to respond to each disaster, and respon-
sibilities of different federal agencies and departments were unclear.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Congress acted to develop the
Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, housed within the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It was not until
1979 that the different disaster relief activities were brought together
into a new agency - the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
through an Executive Order signed by President Carter.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the
agency charged with responding to natural and manmade disasters,
and is identified in the Presidential Decision Directives as the lead
agency for domestic emergency response, in distinction to the FBI
which is designated the lead in investigative response. FEMA's ex-
perience in disaster training and response with its national network of
regional offices provides a nationwide framework for a federal re-
sponse.
With the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, FEMA co-
ordinated its activities through this office. This is not inconsistent
with the FEMA mission - "to lead America to prepare for, prevent,
respond to and recover from disasters with a vision of 'A Nation Pre-
pared. ,,A6
46 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ABOUT FEMA, at
http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm (last updated Sept. 26, 2002).
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1. Problems with FEMA's Role
The U.S. Congress addressed the lack of communication and co-
ordination between the FAA and FEMA during the 9-11 attacks, in
the context of preparation for a biological attack in H.R. 3255, The
Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001 introduced in October
2001. The language of the legislation provides for the continuation of
air travel for FEMA personnel and supplies to travel to disaster areas,
even where air travel has been suspended, otherwise. 47 The legisla-
tion, however, has not been passed.
D. The Role of the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug
Administration
The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Agri-
cultural Research Service (ARS), and the Forest Service are within the
Department of Agriculture and have roles in biodefense. Inspections
of imported foods is a critical role for the Department of Agriculture,
and enhanced monitoring of food safety throughout the cycle of food
production in the United States would be required to protect the public
from agricultural terrorism (agro-terrorism).
The Food and Drug Administration, an agency, cooperates with
the Department of Agriculture on food safety issues, during the food
processing phase. Inspections provide an institutional framework for
addressing the threat of bioterrorism. After September 1 1th the Food
and Drug Administration proposed new guidelines urging tamper-
resistant packaging and other security measures, while the Department
of Agriculture continued to contemplate regulations. The FDA's pro-
posal to require tamper-resistant packaging on fruits and vegetables
met with industry resistance, and the costs associated with the in-
creased rot and temperature is projected by the industry to cost mil-
lions.48
The Public Health Security Act, passed June 12, 2002 addressed
some of these concerns. The new law provides for an expanded role
47 Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001, H.R. 3255, 10 7th Cong. §
126 (2001). Communication between FAA and FEMA. With respect to airspace that
is restricted or closed in response to a bioterrorist attack, the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration and the Director of the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency shall collaborate to develop a plan that provides immediate author-
ityfor personnel of such Agency to travel by aircraft to the geographic areas affected
by the attack, notwithstanding such restriction or closure of air space.
48 Melinda Fulmer, Produce Industry Balks at Food Security Guidelines;
Regulation: Firms say FDA Proposals to Protect Against Bioterrorism are Ineffec-
tive and Costly, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, § 3, at 1.
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for the Food and Drug Administration in the regulation of food safety
to protect against acts of bioterrorism. Subtitle A of the Act provides
for registration of food distribution facilities, inspections, more sys-
tematic refusals of imported food shipments, and surveillance powers
for animal diseases. Subtitle B further provides for protection of the
drug supply through registrations of foreign manufacturers and more
detailed disclosures of components of drugs.
E. The Role of the Department of Defense
The Department of Defense was originally created by the collec-
tion of federal parts of agencies under one Department, at the request
of President Harry Truman. In December 1945, the President asked
Congress to combine the War and Navy Departments into a single
department. Then in 1947, The National Security Act consolidated
the separate military departments into the Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense was conceived in order to defend against
a new national security threat - the Cold War.
The threat of terrorism in recent years inspired the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, created in 1998 by President Clinton. The Presi-
dent was inspired to create the agency, in part, as a result of his read-
ing The Cobra Event, a fictional biological attack scenario, by Richard
Preston. The first director, Dr. Jay Davis, was asked by the President
to read the bioterroristic novel.49 The Agency combined various parts
of the Department of Defense to make grants and implement training
programs for preparation and protection against weapons of mass de-
struction.
The DARPA and SBCCOM were created to explore creative and
new technologies which could be used for the national defense.
DARPA has played a major role in the exploration of surveillance
technologies and biosensing technology in their focus on biological
terrorism. Within DARPA exists the Biosurveillance Program, cre-
ated after 9-11. Admiral John Poindexter was appointed to be its Di-
rector. This office is expected to develop capabilities for the collec-
tion of public health information and other sources of data to create an
early detection system for any biological attack. This group is the
first of the scientific and technological agencies to consider the legal
framework and how their research and development can best be util-
ized.5°
49 Private Conversation with Dr. Jay Davis, Pentagon, Room 3B 253,
(Thursday, July 30, 1998).
50 Victoria Sutton, Privacy Issues and Legal Surveillance, Invited Presenta-
tion at DARPA and The Potomac Institute, Arlington, VA, (Tuesday, June 4, 2002).
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F. The Expanding Role of the Environmental Protection Agency
The statutory basis for involvement of the U.S. EPA in the na-
tional biodefense activities is found in the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), the Comprehensive
Emergency Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),
providing for potential response authority where there is an imminent
and substantial threat to human health or the environment. The Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) are also
important statutes for addressing threats to water systems, and repre-
sent the preventive component of EPA's responsibility. The U.S. EPA
is also a participant in the Domestic Preparedness Program, part of the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.
51
As early as February 1998, the EPA issued a Fact Sheet5 2 outlin-
ing its role in bioterrorism. The EPA with the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Public Health Service (PHS) are cooperatively re-
sponsible for response and training in defense against all weapons of
mass destruction.
In July 1998, the EPA issued another Fact Sheet which described
the role of the U.S. EPA in relation to its responsibilities required by
Presidential Decision Directives 39, 62 and 63. The EPA provides (1)
help to state and local responders to plan for emergencies; (2) coordi-
nation with key Federal Partners; (3) training for first responders; and
(4) provision of resources in the event of a bioterrorism attack.
Within the U.S. EPA, the Office of Emergency and Remedial Re-
sponse (OERR), the Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Preven-
tion Office (CEPPO), the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORIA)
and the National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC) are the
critical components involved in the planning and response activities.
President Clinton gave the U.S. EPA authority for two distinct
parts of counter-terrorism activity:
51 United States Environmental Protection Agency et al., Counter Terrorism
- EPA 's Role and Authority, available at http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/ct-epro.htm (last
modified May 22, 2001).
52 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet EPA 55-F-98-
014 (Feb. 1998).
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(1) Assisting the FBI in determining what sort of hazard-
ous substance may be or has been, released in a terrorist
incident; and
(2) Following an incident, assisting with environmental
monitoring, decontamination efforts, and long-term site
cleanup operations.
53
After the anthrax attacks, the U.S. Congress responded with a
number of proposals which would include additional support from the
U.S. EPA. Recognizing the resources within the EPA, on October 17,
2001, the U.S. Senate introduced S. 1560, The Biological Agent B
Environmental Detection Act of 200 154 which provided for strength-
ening the United States capabilities in environmental detection and the
monitoring of biological agents. The proposal included the enhance-
ment of early detection environmental monitoring technologies in
food, water, air and other vectors, as well as a genomic library for
identification.
55
This bill encouraged cooperative agreements between the gov-
ernment and the private sector in detecting common pathogens; new
technologies and approaches to identify clandestine laboratories; in-
vestigation and development of technologies to identify possible bio-
53 EPA's Role in Counter-Terrorism Activities (Feb. 1998), available at
http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/factsheets/ct-fctsh.pdf.
14 S. 1560, 107th Cong. (2001).
55 See id. at §§ 2-3. § Sec. 2. Findings. Congress makes the followingfind-
ings:
(1) The threat of bioterrorism depends on the ability to produce and distrib-
ute biological agents that cause illness or death. A bioterrorism attack, once
executed, requires containment and treatment that relies on primary-care
provider capabilities as well as information and communication infrastruc-
ture.
(2) Early detection of a biological threat will minimize the number of peo-
ple exposed to the agent and the extent that the agent or disease will spread.
(3) Preventative measures that consider production, processing and distribu-
tion of biological or chemical agents could significantly reduce the threat of
bioterrorism.
(4) New tools capable of detecting small quantities of infectious agents in
food, water, air, and other vectors are needed, as well as a library of the ge-
nomic signatures of unique agents.
Sec. 3. Novel Detection and Surveillance Tools
(a) IN GENERAL. - The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in conjunc-
tion with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Director of
the National Science Foundation, the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, and representatives from industry, shall form an inter-
agency research task force to encourage non-duplicative, public-private re-
search relating to environmental monitoring and detection tools with respect
to biological agents."
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logical or chemical attacks using atmospheric remote detection tech-
nologies; and establishing a means of testing and calibration of new
detection and surveillance tools.56  Although, this proposal never
passed, the Department of Homeland Security announced the imple-
mentation of biological agent air monitoring devices through the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency network of existing air monitoring
devices, January 22, 2003.
1. Decontamination
The U.S. EPA participated in a visible role throughout the anthrax
attacks in decontamination of buildings during the response phase.
This role was part of the national plan outlined above, utilizing the
expertise of EPA in cleaning hazardous waste sites. EPA conducted
the decontamination of the Hart Senate Building and other federal
buildings contaminated during the anthrax attacks of fall 2001.
Reflecting this role, the President's Budget for FY 2003 requested
$124 million in new funding for a total EPA investment of $133.4
million in homeland security, with more than half dedicated to decon-
tamination activities.
5 7
2. Protection of the Nation's Water Supply
In June 1990, four unrelated people living in the same block of
apartment buildings in Edinburgh, Scotland, became infected with
giardiasis, a diarrheal illness caused by a microorganism found in
water. It was discovered that all of the apartment buildings were sup-
56 Id. at § 3(b).
57 Budget of the United States - Fiscal Year 2003, Office of Management
and Budget - The Executive Office of the President (last visited February 7, 2003) at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003.
$75 million For conducting research on better technologies and assess-
ments to clean up buildings contaminated with biological
and chemical agents
$19 million For maintaining security contracts and continue upgrades at
EPA facilities
$16.9 million For conducting drinking water system vulnerability assess-
ments on small to mid-sized systems
$13.2 million For continued operation of the West Coast Environmental
Response Team
$5 million For grants to the states to enhance homeland security coor-
dination
$3.8 million For special agents who will provide environmental crimes
expertise
$0.5 million For enhanced outreach on the Agency's Homeland Security
efforts to the public
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plied water from tanks on the roof, accessible through inspection
hatches. An investigation revealed that fecal material containing the
Giardia cysts was intentionally placed in the tanks.58
Other more dangerous organisms could also be a threat to drink-
ing water supplies, if intentionally used by terrorists.
In June 12, 2002, the U.S. Congress amended the Safe Drinking
Water Act with the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Prepar-
edness and Response Act of 2002, addressing the need to require local
governments to research methods to prevent and respond to inten-
tional contamination of drinking water supplies.5 9 Specifically, the
mandate requires real time monitoring systems for the detection of
contaminants, methods to notify operators and individuals of any
* 61 62
contamination, development of education and awareness, proce-
dures and equipment to prevent the flow of contaminated drinking
water,63 and provision of equipment to mitigate contamination of
drinking water. 64 Regarding supply disruption, the U.S. EPA is to
58 See Robert S. Root-Bernstein, Infectious Terrorism, THE ATLANTIC, May
1991, at 44, 48, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/91may/rootbernstein.htm (explaining how water
supplies are susceptible to premeditated contamination).
" Pub. L. No. 107-188, sec. 401, § 1434-35, ("In General- The Administra-
tor, in consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and, after consultation with
appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Government and with State and
local governments, shall review (or enter into contracts or cooperative agreements to
provide for a review o) current and future methods to prevent, detect and respond to
the intentional introduction of chemical, biological or radiological contaminants into
community water systems and source water for community water systems...').
6 Id. at § 1434(a)(1) ("Methods, means and equipment, including real time
monitoring systems, designed to monitor and detect various levels of chemical, bio-
logical, and radiological contaminants or indicators of contaminants and reduce the
likelihood that such contaminants can be successfully introduced into public water
systems and source water intended to be used for drinking water').
61 Id. at § 1434(a)(2) ("Methods and means to provide sufficient notice to
operators of public water systems, and individuals served by such systems, of the
introduction of chemical, biological or radiological contaminants and the possible
effect of such introduction on public health and the safety and supply of drinking
water').
62 Id. at § 1434(a)(3) ("Methods and means for developing educational and
awareness programs for community water systems').
63 Id. at § 1434 (a)(4) ("Procedures and equipment necessary to prevent the
flow of contaminated drinking water to individuals served by public water systems').
64 Id. at § 1434(a)(5) ("Methods, means, and equipment which could negate
or mitigate deleterious effects on public health and the safety and supply caused by
the introduction of contaminants into water intended to be used for drinking water,
including an examination of the effectiveness of various drinking water technologies
in removing, inactivating, or neutralizing biological, chemical, and radiological
contaminants').
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review methods by which terrorists might disrupt safe water sup-
plies, 65 by destroying pipes or conveyances, 66 destroying distribution
facilities, 67 effecting cross-contamination of water supplies, 68 disrupt-
ing computer controlled systems,69 ways of preventing these results,
70
and in the event of such an attack, the provision of alternative water
supplies.7 '
G. The Role of the Military
The role of the military in civilian biodefense is primarily that of
providing resources and personnel to utilize equipment and resources.
However, other organizations within the Department of Defense, U.S.
Army, - the Material Command and the Medical Command - under-
take weapons of mass destruction research and response activities.
65 Id. at § 1435(a) ("Disruption of Supply or Safety - The Administrator, in
coordination with the appropriate departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment, shall review (or enter into contracts or cooperative agreements to provide for a
review o]) methods and means by which terrorists or other individuals or groups
could disrupt the supply of safe drinking water or take other actions against water
collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution facilities which could
render such water significantly less safe for human consumption... ").
66 Id. at § 1435(a)(1) ("Methods and means by which pipes and other con-
structed conveyances utilized in public water systems could be destroyed or otherwise
prevented from providing adequate supplies of drinking water meeting applicable
public health standards").
67 Id. at § 1435(a)(2) ("Methods and means by which collection, pretreat-
ment, treatment, storage and distribution facilities utilized or used in connection with
public water systems and collection and pretreatment storage facilities used in con-
nection with public water systems could be destroyed or otherwise prevented from
providing adequate supplies of drinking water meeting applicable public health stan-
dards").
61 Id. at§ 1435(a)(3) ("Methods and means by which pipes, constructed con-
veyances, collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution systems that
are utilized in connection with public water systems could be altered or affected so as
to be subject to cross-contamination of drinking water supplies').
9 Id. at § 1435(a)(5) ("Methods and means by which information systems,
including process controls and supervisory control and data acquisition and cyber
systems at community water systems could be disrupted by terrorists or other
groups').
70 Id. at § 1435(a)(4) ("Methods and means by which pipes, constructed
conveyances, collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution systems
that are utilized in connection with public water systems could be reasonably pro-
tected from terrorist attacks or other acts intended to disrupt the supply or affect the
safety of drinking water').
71 Id. at § 1435(b) ("Alternative Sources - The review under this section
shall also include a review of the methods and means by which alternative supplies of
drinking water could be provided in the event of the destruction, impairment or con-
tamination ofpublic water systems').
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Within the Medical Command is the U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMIIRD), which houses the
medical defense program of the United States.
1. Posse Cornitatus
The role of the military is limited by federal legislation and the in-
terpretation of the Posse Comitatus Act. In 1867, the U.S. Congress
passed The Reconstruction Act which established martial law in the
southern states at the end of the U.S. Civil War, 1860-1864. The
Posse Comitatus Act was signed into law June 18, 1878 in response to
abuses of military control over the south after the U.S. Civil War,
during Reconstruction. Thereafter, the United States declared that the
military should never have enforcement powers against civilians, ex-
cept in a declared state of emergency.
The Posse Comitatus Act has been amended to address changing
needs for resources and assistance. In 1968, a separate statutory ex-
ception was created to provide assistance to the Secret Service in car-
rying out its protective duties.72 During the civil disturbances of the
1960s and 1970s, the military was utilized in the development of an
interdepartmental plan for civil disturbances in order to address over-
lapping jurisdictions. 73 The Department of Defense articulated a pol-
icy directive to address terrorist incidents as either a civil disturbance
or a criminal act, and how the incident was defined would give rise to
the legal framework within which it was analyzed.74
In 1981, an amendment to the Act codified the existing relation-
ship between the military and civilian law enforcement agencies. This
provided for increased cooperation through specific provision of intel-
ligence,75 facilities, including materials not reasonably available from
another source which is "any material or expertise of the Department
of Defense appropriate for use in preparing for or responding to an
emergency involving chemical or biological agents," such as biosen-
sors, protective clothing and antidotes, 76 training and advice,77 and
assistance in the operating and maintaining military equipment to
72 Pub. L. No. 90-331, 82 Stat. 170 (1968).
73 Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances (Apr. 1, 1969).
74 See Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.12, Military Assistance for
Civil Disturbances, at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html302512.htm
(Feb. 4, 1994). The Department of Defense initially issued Directive No. 3025.12 on
August 19, 1971. This issuance was cancelled by the updated version in 1994.
7 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2002).
76 10 U.S.C. § 372 (2002).
77 10 U.S.C. § 373 (2002).
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monitor air and sea traffic.78 The Act further provides that the mili-
tary may "monitor, contain, disable, or dispose of the weapon in-
volved or elements of the weapon. 79 In the case of biological weap-
ons, the military may not directly participate in arrest, search or sei-
zure of evidence or intelligence gathering for law enforcement pur-
poses, unless it is necessary to save human life and civilian authorities
are unable to do so. 80 Such involvement by the military is also limited
in time and scope to addressing only the specific biological incident.8
But the 1981 Amendment added additional prohibitions for the
use of the military, including any use which would adversely affect
82military preparedness for national defense, as well as the proviso
that the use of military resources may be contingent upon reimburse-
ment by the local or state governments or other federal agency.83
Following the 1981 Amendment, the interdepartmental plan was
formalized with a Memorandum of Understanding between the De-
partment of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the De-
partment of Defense in 1983 which provided for responsibilities in the
event of a domestic terrorist attack.84 In 1988, another amendment
was made to codifying further clarifications, but added the use of the
military for its new role in drug interdictions, and formally gave the
Department of Defense lead authority for advising civilian law en-
forcement agencies concerning the types of equipment and assistance
available.
The military cannot be used to enforce laws against civilians in
the United States. There are constitutional exceptions to this act, as
well as statutorily provided exceptions. The constitutional exceptions
78 10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(a) (2002).
'9 10 U.S.C. § 382(c) (2002).
80 10 U.S.C. § 382(d) (2002).
81 id.
82 10 U.S.C. § 376 (2002).
83 10 U.S.C. § 377 (2002).
84 Memorandum of Understanding, (Aug. 5, 1983). Although the Posse
Comitatus Act does not permit military personnel to actively engage in the law en-
forcement mission unless expressly authorized, the Act does not prohibit military
observers form reporting to the Department of Defense; nor does it generally prohibit
the preparation of contingency plans for lawful military intervention; advice to civil-
ian officials, sharing intelligence information collected during the normal course of
military operations, including operations relating to the incident; the loan of special-
ized equipment or weaponry; the use of military personnel to deliver and maintain
equipment for civilian use, provided those personnel do not operate that equipment;
or the use of military personnel to train civilian law enforcement officials in the op-
eration and maintenance of military equipment. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378 (2002)
(Military support for civilian law enforcement).
85 10 U.S.C. § 380 (2002).
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are Presidential powers in emergency authority and the protection of
federal property and operations. The act provides for exceptions
where it is "impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States...
by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," 86 or the use of the
military by the President to control an insurrection.87 Otherwise, the
use of the military required that a state's governor make such a re-
quest, and the President must issue an order to activate the military for
that purpose. The failure to have the President formally issue an order
can raise questions with use of the military under the Posse Comitatus
Act.88 However, specific passive activities have been held to be com-
pliant with the Act, which include for example, reconnaissance mis-
89
sions.
In summary, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibiting military in-
volvement with civilians can be excepted in two constitutional excep-
tions and four statutory and regulatory exceptions. The constitutional
exceptions are the President's emergency powers to respond to insur-
rection and the protection of federal property and governmental func-
tions. The statutory powers to the President include a national emer-
gency involving civil disturbances,9" rebellions which make it imprac-
ticable to enforce federal laws,9' any insurrection or violence which
impedes the state's ability to protect citizens and/or the state is unable
or unwilling to protect those rights.92
2. USAMRIID
The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) is the biological defense laboratory housed
within the U.S. Army division of the Department of Defense. The
86 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2002).
87 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (2002).
88 Cf United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (1974) (noting that
"the use of troops to execute the laws [i]s forbidden, unless expressly authorized by
the Constitution or an Act of Congress").
89 See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 924-25 (D. S.D. 1975)
("Congress did not intend to make unlawful the involvement of federal troops in a
passive role in civilian law enforcement activities").90 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334 (2002). See also Department of Defense Directive
No. 3025.12, § 4.1.1, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/htmlU302512.htm (Feb. 4, 1994) (detailing
the President's authority in time of uprisings).
9' 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2002). See also Department of Defense Directive No.
3025.12, § 4.1.1, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, at (Feb. 4, 1994) (re-
garding the President's authority).
92 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2002). See Department of Defense, Directive No. 5525.5
(1986).
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stated mission of the USAMRIID is to conduct research to develop
products, procedures and training programs "for medical defense
against biological warfare threats and naturally occurring infectious
diseases that require special containment.,
93
The USAMRIID focuses on the development of countermeasures
to sustain the fighting ability of the military, and is also engaged in
response to worldwide emerging diseases in investigation and re-
sponse activities with the CDC. The military and civilian staff in-
cludes physicians, veterinarians, microbiologists, pathologists, chem-
ists, molecular biologists, physiologists and pharmacologists. The
staff of the USAMRIID includes 70 Medical Research Volunteer Sub-
jects (MRVS) who are highly trained laboratory technicians who have
requested to participate in clinical trials of vaccines and drugs devel-
oped at USAMRIID, which comprise the first phase of human testing
in the vaccine and drug development protocol. The staff also includes
teams which are trained to deploy to combat zones to establish diag-
nostic laboratories, or to respond to a disease outbreak, anywhere in
the world, and to evaluate patients under the most stringent contain-
ment conditions.
USAMRIID works to improve vaccines for anthrax, Venezuelan
equine encephalitis, plague, and botulism, and to develop new vac-
cines for toxins such as staphylococcal enterotoxins and ricin. Work
is also being conducted for medical countermeasures to viral hemor-
rhagic fevers and arboviral illnesses, and for the development of diag-
nostic tools for identifying the presence of biological agents or en-
demic disease threats.
3. National Guard Bureau
The National Guard Bureau is a division of the Department of De-
fense, Reserve Affairs and includes the 54 National Guard units in the
states and territories. The responsibilities of the National Guard in-
clude the "contracting for supplies and services, managing supply
operations and movements, preparing and distributing meals, purify-
ing, storing, and removing waste, repairing vehicles and equipment,
" USAMRIID, GENERAL INFORMATION, at
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/general/index.html (last modified July 25, 2002). The
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) conducts
research to develop strategies, products, information, procedures, and training pro-
grams for medical defense against biological warfare threats and naturally occurring
infectious diseases that require special containment. USAMRIlD, an organization of
the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), is the lead
medical research laboratory for the U.S. Biological Defense Research Program.
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constructing life support centers and removing debris. ' 94  The Na-
tional Guard may be utilized by the Governor, 95 or by the President,
96
in a state or national emergency, respectively.
H. The Role of the Public Health Service and the Indian Health Ser-
vice (IHS) and the Department of Veterans Affairs
These three agencies, the Public Health Service, the Indian Health
Service and the Department of Veterans Affairs have national health-
care responsibilities. The U.S. Public Health Service is provided with
quarantine and inspection powers where communicable diseases may
spread into the United States or from one state to another.97 The Pub-
lic Health Service has no specific role in the federal bioterrorism re-
sponse responsibilities. However, after the anthrax attacks, one bill
was introduced to mandate that the U.S. Public Health Service have
membership in the National Security Council, although that measure
has thus far failed. 98
The Indian Health Service (IHS) is a component of the U.S. Pub-
lic Health Service and its mission to deliver healthcare to Native
Americans.99 The Indian Health Service was the lead agency in the
94 Barry Kellman, Managing Terrorism's Cbnsequences: Legal Issues, THE
MEMORIAL INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM, Chs. 2, 26 (forthcoming
March 2002).
95 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2000) (detailing the Governor's
power over the National Guard).
96 See 32 U.S.C. §§ 104(d)-(c), I 11 (2000) (detailing the President's power
over the National Guard).
97 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002). See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.1-73.0 (2002). Com-
municable disease means illnesses due to infectious agents or their toxic products,
which may be transmitted from a reservoir to a susceptible host either directly as
from an infected person or animal or indirectly through the agency of an intermediate
plant or animal host, vector, or the inanimate environment. (42 C.F.R. §
70. 1(a)(2002).
98 Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001, H.R. 3255, 107"h Cong. §
127 (2001). Public Health Representation on the NSC. It is the sense of the congress
that the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service should serve as a member of
the National Security Council.
99 U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Indian Health Service Introduc-
tion, at http://www.ihs.gov/AboutlHS/IHSintro.asp (last modified June 18, 2002).
The Indian Health Service states "Our Mission... to raise the physical, mental, so-
cial, and spiritual health of American Indians and Alaska Natives to the highest level.
Our Goal... to assure that comprehensive, culturally acceptable personal and public
health services are available and accessible to American Indian and Alaska Native
people. Our Foundation [is]... to uphold the Federal Government's obligation to
promote healthy American Indian and Alaska Native people, communities, and cul-
tures and to honor and protect the inherent sovereign rights of Tribes. " Id.
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investigation of the Haunta virus outbreak in the Navajo Nation, and
has had the experience of addressing a highly lethal biological agent
in an epidemiological investigation. Interestingly, IHS was not in-
cluded in the agencies involved in homeland security issues in the
President's proposal (See Figure 3).
The Department of Veterans Affairs manages a system of hospi-
tals throughout the United States which serve qualified military veter-
ans throughout their lives. The system of hospitals provides an oppor-
tunity for a federal presence in communities in creating a national
biodefense system, ensuring trained military medical personnel are
within communities throughout the U.S.
I. Other Departments and Agencies
There are components of every cabinet-level department and
many agencies which have a role in homeland security, and are an
important part of an integrated plan to address bioterrorism. In the
President's Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security, a dia-
gram identifies the organizations within the federal government with a
role in homeland security. About 60% of those agencies have an im-
portant role specifically in bioterrorism.
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Figure 3: President George W. Bush, The Department
of Homeland Security (June 2002).'0 °
III. FEDERALISM, NATIONAL SECURITY, STATES
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PROPOSAL
Biodefense is currently supported through the distribution of
powers between the national government, state government and pri-
vate groups; the other weapons of mass destruction are preempted by
federal legislation and are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government (See Fig. 4). The unique features of bioterrorism coupled
with a legal framework, unlike that of any of the other weapons of
mass destruction, require analysis of not only the resources of the na-
100 President George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (June
2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/book.pdf.
20031
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tional government and those of the state governments, but also the
constitutional framework in which any changes must be balanced.
A. The President's Proposal for a Department of Homeland Security
A legislative solution in order to provide for a federal role is re-
quired to address the need for federal involvement in peace time with
public health powers. The most important movement in that direction
has been the President's proposal for a Department of Homeland Se-
curity, June 6, 2002.101
On June 6, 2002, President George W. Bush proposed a new De-
partment of Homeland Security,'0 2 which would become the third
largest department in the President's cabinet (See Figure 4). This
proposal comes just nine months after the formation of the Office of
Homeland Security, which the President found insufficient to address
the needs of governmental organization. This legislation also closely
follows the passage of the Public Health Security Act and Bioterror-
ism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002103 assigning most of the
bioterrorism responsibilities in the federal government to the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, passed June 12, 2002, although
making no significant commitments toward assuming more national
responsibility, except in existing areas of federal authority through
federal environmental and agricultural statutes.
101 See Analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/hsl-bill-analysis.pdf (last visited
Oct. 7, 2002) (analyzing and explaining the sections of the Homeland Security Act).
102 President George W. Bush, The Department of Homeland Security (June
2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptoffomeland/book.pdf.
103 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (June 12, 2002) (updating government
powers in response to terrorist attacks).
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Figure 4: From Pres. George W. Bush, The Department
of Homeland Security (June 2002)
Department of Homeland Security
, ,M: rhev MUM I*' BPI
Legislation for a Department of Homeland Security was intro-
duced in the U.S. House of Representatives in June, and was assigned
to Committee in the House, 0 4 and then passed the House of Represen-
tatives in a vote of 295 to 132, July 26, 2002. In August and Septem-
ber, the U.S. Senate offered amendments, in part amending the status
of federal government employees to enjoy all civil service employ-
ment protections, in distinction to the House bill which provided for
more flexibility in hiring and firing of employees in a Department of
Homeland Security.105
104 Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 [H.R. 5005], Nov. 25, 2002,
107 t  Cong. (2d Sess. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofbomelandbill/hsl-bill.pdf.
105 S. 2452, 107t Cong. (2002).
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The legislation languished until after the midterm elections and a
new Republican Senate majority was elected. On November 19, 2002
the Senate passed a Department of Homeland Security bill, 90-9; and
on November 22, 2002, the House agreed to the Senate amendments.
The bill became law on November 25, 2002 with the President's sig-
nature.
The approach to weapons of mass destruction has been to address
them in the same manner with the same organizations within the fed-
eral government; however, the President proposed separate offices for
chemical, nuclear and biological, acknowledging the need for differ-
ent approaches. But more importantly, the inclusion of biological
threats includes a federal field not heretofore occupied by the federal
government, as are nuclear and chemical activities of all kinds. Even
on the basis of public safety, a federal court has held that the federal
government has preempted the field in nuclear activities; and although
public safety may be a sovereign power of the states, it cannot legis-
late in a field which has been preempted constitutionally by the fed-
eral government.
The President's proposal for a Department of Homeland security
begins with a statement signaling that the federal government was
taking responsibility for public health in a bioterrorism context: "The
President's most important job is to protect and defend the American
people." His discussion criticized the lack of one agency with a pri-
mary mission of homeland security. The dispersed functions among
the "more than 100 different government organizations" was cited as
evidence of this lack of centralization. In this reorganization, the
President makes three very strong indications that the shift in federal-
ism from the states to the federal government should occur in the field
of bioterrorism.
Among the reasons cited that "The Department of Homeland Se-
curity would make Americans safer" was "because our nation would
have: . . . One department to coordinate our efforts to protect the
American people against bioterrorism and other weapons of mass
destruction." Critical is the use of the word "protect" because it shifts
the responsibility to the federal government from the state government
in matters of public health law protection of public health. The con-
stitutional balance of federalism reserves those powers not enumer-
ated to Congress nor prohibited by it to the states [Tenth Amend-
ment]. Among those powers reserved to the states is the power to
protect its citizens in matters of public health. Only during a national
emergency or threat of national security does the power shift to the
federal government. In the President's proposal, the power shifts to
the federal government during the time to "protect" the American
people which would be the period before a bioterrorism event begins
[Vol. 13:117
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to become evident, because after that point the opportunity to truly
protect the American people is diminished.
In the example of "[c]ommunicating to the American people," 10 6
the report reads: "The new Department would ensure that local law
enforcement entities - and the public - receive clear and concise in-
formation from their national government."'0 7 This is a second criti-
cal signal in the report that authority of the states in public health will
be shifted to the "national government" in the context of "a chemical
or biological attack."'0 8 This is counter to current response protocols
which specify that state governments will take the lead in a bioterror-
ism attack [e.g., CDC Smallpox Response Plan, Nov. 19, 2001], and
in conflict with the current Model Public Health Law, posed by the
National Governors Association and the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. The federal approach is more consistent with the role
of national security in our balance of federalism, and should shift the
power from the states to the federal government, even in peace time.
The third example reads that the "scientific assets" are described
which would make possible the detection of bioterrorist attacks:
The anthrax attacks of October 2001 proved that quick rec-
ognition of biological terrorism is crucial to saving lives. The
Department of Homeland Security would lead efforts to de-
velop, deploy, manage and maintain a national system for de-
tecting the use of biological agents within the United States.
This system would consist of a national public health data
surveillance system to monitor public and private databases
for indications that a bioterrorist attack has occurred, as well
as a sensor network to detect and report the release of bioter-
rorist pathogens in densely populated areas.'09
This is the third critical mention of a shift of power from state
public health authority to federal authority. The "maintain", "man-
age", and "monitor""0 verbs indicate a federal government involve-
ment before a national security attack occurs - before the time when
power shifts from the states to the federal government in our constitu-
tional framework. The nature of biological attack, however, makes
essential that a federal system of monitoring be in place to carry out
the national security role of the federal government.
106 Bush, supra note 100, at 5.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Bush, supra note 100, at 13.
110 Id.
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The legislation does not mandate more responsibility for the na-
tional government, but attempts to maintain the cooperative federal-
ism approach to national security in biodefense - unlike areas of
chemical, nuclear and radiological threats. Through the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
existing federal powers in the area of federal environmental statutes
were expanded in scope to include protection of the nation's drinking
water from bioterrorists' attacks under the relevant federal statute,"' l
and for the protection of the nation's food supply under another rele-
vant federal statute." 2 Functions of the Department of Health and
Human Services under the Public Health Security Act are transferred
to the new Department of Homeland Security for the Strategic Na-
tional Stockpile and for Smallpox vaccine development." 
3
While the federal government begins to examine its national ap-
proach, states are moving ahead with what has been their traditional
authority and power - to protect the public health of its citizens. On
September 19, 2002, the National Governors Association (NGA),
announced their plan to develop a national network for homeland se-
curity information, beginning with a pilot plan which involves five to
eight states." 4 Governor Barnes, Georgia, was quoted as saying, "To
date, the main costs of homeland security have been born almost en-
tirely by the state and local government ... We can't really wait until
next year to get this money [money currently appropriated by Con-
gress]." 5 This effort may not be consistent with a national approach,
which will exacerbate the existing lack of coordination between the
national and state governments. For example, each state will have its
own version of any statutory mandate for homeland security, much
like the states who have proceeded with genetic legislation in the al-
most complete absence of action on the part of Congress. Now half of
the states have some kind of law regulating the use of genetic infor-
mation, using many different approaches. " 6 Further, the use of com-
pacts between states is specifically forbidden by the Constitution.' 7
... 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3 to i-4 (2002).
112 Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-99 (2002).
"' P.L. 107-188 [H.R. 2448], June 12, 2002, Public Health Security Act and
Bioterrorism and Preparedness Act of 2002, § 905(a).
114 Press Release, Governors Announce New Homeland Security Initiatives,
Propose Driver's License Project, at
http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/l1, 1169,C_PRESSRELEASE^D_4360,00.htm.
115 Id.
116 VICTORIA SUTTON, LAW AND BIOTECHNOLOGY, § 2.0 (forthcoming 2003).
117 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation").
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James Madison, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers ex-
plained, that "for reasons which need no explanation" the prohibition
against states entering into treaties "is copied into the new Constitu-
tion" from the Articles of Confederation. 1 8 Compacts among states,
therefore may be unconstitutional without explicit approval from
Congress. "19
A national approach to biodefense will ultimately require a shift
in federalism, and if the Department of Homeland Security legislation
is passed, it is predictable that amendments will follow which will
move toward a more national approach to homeland security and to
move away from the present, fifty different systems. James Madison,
with particular foresight in the context of biodefense, wrote, "[i]f,
therefore, . . . the people should in future become more partial to the
federal than to the State governments, . . . the people ought not surely
to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due.' 20 Alexander Hamilton, further warned
against becoming a nation that does not allow for preparation of a
national defense before attack: "[Warning that we should not be] a
nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense before it
was actually invaded."'
121
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that the protection
and preservation of the public health is among the most important
duties of state government, i22 however, James Madison wrote that
"[s]tate legislatures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently
to national objects.' 23
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The responsibilities of the federal government for homeland secu-
rity require an executive branch infrastructure which is capable of
meeting the challenge of biodefense. The most important change in
federalism that can be made in biodefense is to create a national sys-
18 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 280-81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
119 See, e.g., Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)
(2002) (authorizing states to enter into compacts to provide for the operation of re-
gional disposal facilities for low-level radioactive waste).
120 THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
121 THE FEDERALIST No. 25 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed, 1961)
(discussing the importance of raising armies in peacetime).
122 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905) (holding that
Massachusetts could constitutionally require vaccination of its citizens to preserve
public health).123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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tem of public health surveillance, with a uniform system of reporting.
It is not enough that PHSA 126(a) provides for the federal govern-
ment to evaluate public health surveillance technology for states' use.
There must be a national surveillance system, with meaningful data
which can predict the earliest stages of an attack, not fifty different
systems with jurisdictional lines which become not only meaningless,
but serve as impediments to responding to a public health emergency.
The proposed Department of Homeland Security has been organ-
ized without including the federal law enforcement organization
which has been designated as the lead agency for responding to bio-
logical attacks - the FBI. While other agencies and departments have
divisions excised for transfer to the new Department, the FBI has no
such transfer of any functions. If the lead for a bioterrorism attack is
to remain with the FBI, then the new Department of Homeland Secu-
rity makes little progress in the organization of the federal govern-
ment. At least the relevant investigative units should be transferred
from the FBI to the new Department of Homeland Security.
The new division of Biological and Agricultural Terrorism must
address the very different legal jurisdictions, as illustrated in Figure 5.
While conceptually, these threats may seem appropriate to group to-
gether, the legal framework is so different between human public
health and agricultural terrorism, that legislation will be needed to
have any national jurisdiction over public health. The new legislation
creating the Department of Homeland Security has a mere coordina-
tion role with states and local governments.
Finally, it is not evident that human public health is included in
this organization, other than through a staff line to the Secretary la-
beled, "state, local and private sector coordination." (see Figure 4).
Allowing our homeland defense against bioterrorism to be left in the
hands of each individual state is a recipe for disaster. In James Madi-
son's persuasive discussion for federalism, he wrote, "[s]tate legisla-
tures will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national ob-
jects." The need for a national system of biodefense is essential to
utilize the fifty state systems and resources. Without sacrificing the
experience and expertise of each state, a movement toward a national
linking of every state - more than a coordination mechanism - is im-
perative, before time and divergent legislatures make it more difficult
to address. But most importantly, the future of our defense is a stake,
and it is that aspect of federalism described by The Federalists, which
enables our nation to respond to a homeland security threat, and con-
currently recognize the Constitutional assignment of powers.
[Vol. 13:117
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Figure 5: Distribution of Powers in Biodefense compared
to Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction
ASSOCIATIONS, NGOs
National Ac of Governors (NGA)
Asac of te and Territorial lealth Oficials (ASTHO)
Ntional Assoc. of Counry and City Iealth Officials (NACCIO)
Assoc. of Public Health Laboratories (APHL)
Cooperative agreements foe
x'olantecrism uniform reporting (CDC)
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
STATES:Commnical ood Safety ad Inspections (SA)
Public Health (Humans) Diseases (umar odSftyadIsecin FA
AnimalLivestock and crops (USDA. EPA)
Vaccinations (Pets& Wildlife) Federal crimes, bioterrotism (FBI)
Quarantine Biotcfrrosm Nuclear Threats (DOE. FBI)Surveillance Crime$
Chemical Threats (EPA, FBI)
Environmental Threats (EPA)
1IPPA Cteanup of biological hardous nalls
Professional Licensing saer sipph. Safe Drining W ler Act
Surti= uonio. Clean Water Act
Air, Clean Air Act
Plannig and Emr.nvics, EPCRKA
INDIVI DUALS:
~~Private Physicians
Healthcare Providers
V. CONCLUSION
The organization of the federal government is essential to biode-
fense. National security is the highest of compelling interests that
might be held by a government. The federalism aspects of the move-
ment from a state-based system of national security, to a national sys-
tem of biodefense requires more than the piecemeal approach offered
by the Public Health Security Act of 2002, but also more than the re-
organization of agencies and departments into a Department of Home-
land Security without consideration of the federalism balance that
must be struck. Although these are both important pieces of legisla-
tion which move toward a national system of biodefense, both fall
short of addressing the shift in federalism necessary to effect the in-
tent of Congress, which is to "(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the
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United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to ter-
rorism; [and] (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery,
from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States."' 24 Con-
gress should consider the federalism relationship in the context of
biodefense to affect a true national defense.
124 Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107 th Cong. §§ 101(b)(1)(a)-
(c) (2002).
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